# TimeTrust: Robust Timing via Hareware Roots of Trust

University of Birmingham:

Andreea-Ina Radu a.i.radu@bham.ac.uk

Tom Chothia <u>t.p.chothia@bham.ac.uk</u> University of Surrey:

Christopher J.P. Newton <u>c.newton@surrey.ac.uk</u>

Ioana Boureanu i.boureanu@surrey.ac.uk

Liqun Chen liqun.chen@surrey.ac.uk







#### The TimeTrust Project part of UK RISE (Research Institute in Secure Hardware and Embedded Systems)

Robust Timing via Hardware Roots of Trust and Non-standard Hardware -with Application to EMV Contactless Payments- (04/2019 - 11/2022)





**PI - Ioana Boureanu** Professor in Secure Systems





**Chris Newton** Research Associate Mike Ward Director, Product



Development and Innovation, EMV & Digital Devices



Professor in Secure Systems



UNIVERSITY<sup>OF</sup> BIRMINGHAM

Andreea-Ina Radu Research Associate **Charles Chen** Senior Director – EMV Solutions

**Fraser Dickin** Senior Research Engineer









Anna Clee, PhD Student

**Steve Pannifer** Director



#### TimeTrust Research:



 plus papers on side channel resistance for sel4, ICS hardware vulnerabilities, theory of distance bounding, attack on Knox v2









# Relay protections



relay resistant protocol



### Life was good in 2015

- The world stops a deadly virus (Ebola) by taking swift science-based measure.
- 195 countries sign the the Paris Climate Agreement.
- Global poverty at record low.
- Mr. Robot was released.
- There was finally a good Star Wars film







### Apple Pay Express Travel

# 

Paying for journeys on Transport for London is easier with Express Mode for Apple Pay You no longer need to authenticate your payment with Face ID or Touch ID. Simply select a card for travel in Wallet. Then just tap your iPhone or Apple Watch on the yellow card reader and go.





395 396 397 397 397 397 397	86516 39   14576 39   65584 39   67828 39   95920 39   99572 39   31984 39	2588884   Tag 2619344   Rdr 2766576   Rdr 2770196   Tag 2798384   Rdr 2805460   Tag 2842512   Rdr	04 00  50 00  52  04 00  93 20  08 87  93 70	) 57 ) / be ) 08	/ cd f3 87	l c2 be	f3	c2	d4	dØ										ok     	HAL WUF AN1 SEL	LT PA TICOLL LECT_UI	D
39 39	0	17376	Rdr	6a	02	c8	01	00	03	00	02	79	00	00	00	00	c2	d8				ok	
39	266640	267632	Rdr	167	1919	~		35.22						5.8							ĺ		WUPA
40	501552	518928	Rdr	6a	02	c8	01	00	03	00	02	79	00	00	00	00	c2	d8				ok	
	768480	769472	Rdr	52																			WUPA
40	770708	//30/6	lag	04	00																5	10	
	/82928	/8/090		40	00	5/	01	00	02	00	00	70	00	00	00	00	~?	40			8	OK	HALI
40	949000 1970009	900404   107108/		0d	02	Co	01	00	03	00	62	/9	00	00	00	00	CΖ	uo			ł	I OK	   \\/  DA
40	1273252	1271904	Tan	104	aa																9		
	1280544	1285312	Rdr	150	00	57	cd														2	l l ok	I HALT
	1403456	1404448	Rdr	152			00														2		I WUPA
_	1405716	1408084	Tag	04	00																5	-	
	1409728	1412192	Rdr	93	20																3	1	ANTICOLL
	1413396	1419220	Tag	08	c2	2f	46	a3													2		
	1420544	1431008	Rdr	93	70	08	c2	2f	46	a3	c8	4d									8	ok	SELECT_UI
	1432276	1435860	Tag	20	fc	70																]	
	1799856	1800848	Rdr	52																			WUPA
	1802116	1804484	Tag	04	00																		
	1809668	1815556	Tag	08	92	1c	22	a4															ļ
	1816912	1827376	Rdr	93	70	08	92	1c	22	a4	9e	87										ok	SELECT_UI
	1828644	1832228	Tag	20	fc	70																	
	2192880	2193872	Rdr	52																			WUPA
e	ntry_clapha	m_south.log																					





# Mastercard Relay Resistant Protocol





VS



# Mastercard Relay Resistant Protocol

Mastercard RRP rrp 1 average





# Visa's Relay Protection Protocol

- Works at ISO 14443 Level 1, so really good timing!
- Broken due to rookie protocol mistakes.
- They aimed to only protect against attacks using COTS mobile phones but failed to do that.
- Models in Tamarin and ProVerif, but not really needed.





# How do we solve all this?

Mastercard RRP rrp 1 average

#### Anticollision level

Mastercard RRP select uid average







#### Adding our Protocol to the ISO 14443 Standard

- March: Reach out to the ISO/ IEC 14443 BSI UK mirror group
- July: Present the proposal to them in person and get their approval.
- August: get support of EMV Co. and NXP
- Oct: They took it to ISO smart card security working group ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17/WG 8, Berlin, who have approved the addition in principle.
- Next, we write a full draft to by voted on by all ISO countries (usually follows the working group)





# Question?